How should central banks reduce inflation? - Conceptual issues by Mervyn King




t is tempting to give a very short answer to
the title of the session—raise interest rates
and reduce monetary growth. But when and
by how much? That raises two questions which
are central to the design of monetary policy.
First, starting from an inflationary episode, how
quickly should inflation be reduced to its desired
level? Second, should monetary policy react to
shocks to output as well as to inflation? The two
questions are closely related and are the subject
of this paper.
Both questions were faced by the United King-
dom following departure from the exchange rate
mechanism (ERM) in September 1992. At that
time, the latest published inflation rate (retail
price inflation excluding mortgage interest pay-
ments) was 4.2 percent, but that was following
a recession during which output fell, relative to
trend, by almost 10 percent, and the sterling
effective exchange rate had just depreciated by
13 percent. The policy challenge was to prevent
the depreciation having second-round effects on
wages and prices, and to keep inflation falling
during a recovery in output that had already
started.
The exchange rate link was replaced by a
domestic monetary framework defined in terms
of an inflation target. The objective was to achieve
“price stability” in the long run, defined by the
then Chancellor, as a measured inflation rate of
0 to 2 percent a year. But the aim was not to bring
inflation down to below 2 percent by the next
month, or even the next year. It was to approach
price stability gradually. In October 1992 a wide
band of 1 to 4 percent for the target range of
inflation was announced, with the additional
objective of reaching a level below 2.5 percent
by the end of the Parliament, a date then some
four to five years ahead. The implicit assumption
was that it would take approximately five years to
make the transition to price stability. In the
event, inflation fell below 2.5 percent in March
1994, remained below that level for ten months,
but then rose again to just over 3 percent. In
August 1996 inflation was 2.8 percent.
In 1995 the target was modified. Monetary
policy would aim consistently to achieve an
inflation rate of 2.5 percent or less some two
years ahead. Shocks would mean that inflation
would sometimes be above and sometimes
below that figure. But in the long run, if policy
were successful in achieving the target, inflation
would average 2.5 percent or less. The stated
objective of monetary policy was permanently
low inflation. There was no mention of output
Mervyn King is Chief Economist and Executive Director
at the Bank of England. He presented this paper at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 1996 symposium,
“Achieving Price Stability,” in Jackson Hole, Wyoming,
August 29-31, 1996. as an explicit consideration in setting monetary
policy.
Other countries have shown an equal reluc-
tance to move quickly to price stability. Table 1
shows those countries which have in recent years
adopted an explicit inflation target. Except for
Australia, in all cases target inflation was below
the existing rate of inflation. And in most cases,
there was planned to be a gradual transition to
price stability. A good example is that of Canada,
which planned to bring inflation down from over
6 percent to a range of 1 to 3 percent over four
years. New Zealand is a contrast in which the
aim was to move quickly from an inflation rate
of 7 percent to a range of 0 to 2 percent.
Table 2 shows average inflation rates in each
decade since 1950 for the G-3 countries and the
seven industrialized countries which adopted
inflation targets. From a peak in the 1970s and
1980s, inflation declined steadily. But only in
Germany, Japan, and New Zealand was there
anything other than a slow adjustment to low
inflation. Chart 1 compares the path of the infla-
tion rate since 1950 for the G-3 countries and the
inflation target countries as a group. Not sur-
prisingly, on average the countries which sub-
sequently adopted an inflation target experienced
higher inflation than the G-3 over most of the
period. It is interesting that following an infla-
tion shock there were rather different speeds of
adjustment. Japan, in particular, appears to have
brought inflation down more quickly than either
the United States or the inflation target countries
over the past 20 years.
Is it possible to explain the different responses
of the two sets of countries? It is important to
distinguish between two speeds of adjustment.
The first is the speed at which the inflation target
implicit in monetary policy converges to price
Table 1
COUNTRIES WITH INFLATION TARGETS
Country
Price





Australia CPI 1993  1.8 Average  of
2%-3%
Canada CPI February 1991   6.2 1%-3% from
1995
Finland CPI Early 1993   2.6 2% from 1995
Israel CPI December 1991 18.0 8%-11% for
1995
New Zealand CPI March 1990   7.0 0%-2%
Spain CPI November 1995   4.4 Below 3% by
1997
Sweden CPI Early 1993   4.8 2% ± 1% from
1995
United Kingdom RPIX October 1992   4.2 2.5% or less
26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYstability—the optimal speed of disinflation. The
second is the speed at which policy offsets a tem-
porary shock to inflation—the flexibility of mone-
tary policy. In countries with a credible commitment
to price stability (or to a stable low inflation rate,
as in the G-3) only the second speed of adjust-
ment is relevant. But in countries attempting to
change from a regime of moderate or high inflation
to one of price stability, there is an additional
issue of the optimal speed of disinflation. That
depends on how rapidly private sector expecta-
tions of inflation adapt to the change in regime.
It has been argued that “the United States is
only one recession away from price stability.”
In contrast, it has been suggested that the
United Kingdom is only one expansion away
from diverging from price stability. Too slow a
convergence on price stability, and too great an
accommodation of inflation shocks, have their
dangers. The ultimate target becomes less cred-
ible. So what determines the optimal speed of
disinflation and how flexible should monetary
policy be in the face of shocks? Those questions
are analyzed in the second and third sections,
respectively. I shall assume that the long-term
objective of monetary policy is price stability.
1
I. THE OPTIMAL SPEED OF
DISINFLATION
In this section I examine the speed of disinfla-
tion that would be chosen by a central bank in a
world in which monetary policy affects real
Table 2
INFLATION RATE BY DECADE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Average of:
Country 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990-95
Countries with inflation targets:
Australia 6.5 2.4 9.8 8.4 3.3
Canada 2.4 2.5 7.4 6.5 2.7
Finland 6.2 5.1 10.4 7.3 2.7
New Zealand 5.1 3.3 11.5 11.9 2.7
Spain 6.2 5.8 14.4 10.3 5.3
Sweden 4.5 3.8 8.6 7.9 5.0
United Kingdom 4.3 3.5 12.7 6.9 4.6
G3 countries:
Germany 1.1 2.4 4.9 2.9 3.2
Japan 2.9 5.3 8.9 2.5 1.6
United States 2.1 2.3 7.1 5.5 3.5
Note: Inflation is measured in terms of the Consumer Price Index, except in the United Kingdom, where RPIX is used,
which excludes mortgage interest payments.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 27output and employment in the short run but not
in the long run. I shall make two points. First,
irrespective of the instruments used to imple-
ment it, monetary policy is a combination of an ex
ante inflation target chosen each period and a
discretionary response to certain shocks. Those
shocks are ones to which the central banks can
respond before the private sector is able to adjust
nominal contracts. Second, in general, it is not
optimal to move immediately to a regime of
price stability unless that regime can be made
fully credible by institutional or other changes. 
Following a prolonged period of inflation,
why should a central bank not move immedi-
ately to price stability? The answer is that there
are costs of disinflation, and, moreover, those
costs increase more than proportionally with the
rate of disinflation. Such costs result from a
change in the monetary policy regime—the target
inflation rate—because private sector agents can-
not easily tell whether the regime has changed or
not. Learning takes time. And the longer the
period during which inflation was high, the
longer it is likely to be before the private sector
is persuaded that policy has changed. An unan-
ticipated disinflation will depress output because
wages and prices take time to adjust to the new
lower price level (relative to expectations). Disin-
flations in both the United States and the United
Kingdom in the early 1980s proved costly in
terms of lost output and employment.
The speed at which expectations adjust during
that transition will influence the magnitude of
the output loss. A central bank can lower those
costs by reducing the gap between private sector
inflation expectations and the inflation target
Chart 1
















Note: Inflation target countries are those shown in Table 1.
Percent
28 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYimplied by its own monetary policy. A target is
credible when the gap is zero. Indeed, “rational
expectations” are defined as those where expected
inflation is equal to the inflation target. But the
mere announcement of a commitment to price
stability as the basis for monetary policy is unlikely
to generate full credibility quickly. Indeed, in
a deeper sense, expectations are likely to be
influenced by the commitment to price stability
among the public at large. Institutional changes
such as central bank independence, may improve
credibility; but when they do so, it is largely
because they reflect a commitment among the
public to the objective of price stability.
The optimal speed of disinflation depends,
therefore, on the real output costs of changing
expectations held by the private sector about the
intentions of the central bank to reduce inflation.
Those costs reflect the existence of a short-term
tradeoff between inflation and output. Such a
tradeoff reflects nominal stickiness in wages
and prices, which results from the cost of pro-
cessing information in order to determine the
prices which it is optimal to charge, as well as
incomplete adjustment of expectations to changes
in the monetary policy regime. In a survey of
200 firms, Blinder (1994) found that “almost 80
percent of GDP is repriced quarterly or less
frequently.” Both nominal stickiness and slow
adjustment of inflation expectations play a role in
the analysis set out below. Nominal stickiness
means that the central bank can affect output in
the short run because monetary policy is able
to respond to at least some of the shocks
hitting the economy before wages and prices
can be adjusted by private sector agents. I do
not assume that the central bank has private
information—except about its own preferences
for price stability. There can be few decisions
where the relevant information is more widely
available to, and analyzed by, the public than
monetary policy. But the central bank may be
able to respond to a shock before all wages and
prices have adjusted, and it is that speed of
response which enables monetary policy to
influence the extent to which shocks impact on
output or inflation. Of course, there will be some
shocks to which even the central bank will find
it difficult to respond in time, and such shocks
introduce a random element into the behavior of
inflation despite the best efforts of central banks
to control the price level. 
The speed at which expectations adjust to
changes in inflation was a key element in the
expectations-augmented Phillips curve of Fried-
man and Phelps. In their model, expectations
adjusted slowly to changes in actual inflation,
and the central bank could raise output for a time
by raising the inflation rate. At a constant infla-
tion rate, expectations would be consistent with
actual inflation, and unemployment would be
at its natural rate. It was the assumption of
rational expectations that enabled Lucas (1973)
to undermine the theoretical plausibility of even
a short-run trade-off. Monetary policy could
not affect output because expectations adjusted
immediately. Only when the private sector had
incomplete information about monetary policy
could changes in money affect output. That is
because, in the Lucas model, agents are uncer-
tain about how to interpret changes in nominal
prices. Do they reflect changes in the aggregate
money stock or are they changes in relative
prices? Confusion can exist for awhile because
neither the money supply nor the aggregate
price level is perfectly observable. Such an
assumption is not plausible empirically. The
world is not short of statistics on money and
inflation. But nominal stickiness—nominal con-
tracts which last for several periods—mean that
future inflation matters. And agents, although
able to observe current money supply, may be
uncertain about how the central bank will con-
duct monetary policy in the future. So differ-
ences between actual and anticipated monetary
policy will affect output.
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ducted will alter private sector expectations. It
is not sensible to ignore that aspect of a change
in monetary policy, as was done in the more
extreme Keynesian models. Equally, however,
it is too extreme to suppose expectations adjust
immediately to a new regime. Learning takes
place in real time. As Brunner and Meltzer
put it,
Both positions are unacceptable. The Keynesians
failed to recognize that people learn and are not
locked into their beliefs and behavior. The new
classical macroeconomists introduce learning but
neglect costs of acquiring information. Neglect of
these costs leads them to exaggerate the speeds of
learning and response in the marketplace and the
knowledge that people have about the future in a
changing and uncertain world (1993, p.132).
Nevertheless, Sargent (1986) has argued that
a sharp disinflation may be preferable to gradu-
alism because expectations adjust quickly. There is
no doubt that the “rational expectations” approach
to understanding changes in monetary regimes
has been very important. When governments
change behavior, agents learn. But how do they
learn and over what time span? Those are the
key questions the answers to which determine
the optimal speed of disinflation. In Sargent’s
view, “gradualism invites speculation about future
reversals, or U-turns, in policy” (p.150). Excessive
gradualism surely does so; but so does excessive
radicalism. Sargent’s strictures on gradualism
relate primarily to paths toward price stability
that are accompanied by large and persistent
government budget deficits. On that I fully agree.
Unless budget deficits are reduced to levels
consistent with price stability, no commitment
to price stability is credible. In what follows I
shall assume that deficits are on a path consistent
with price stability in the long run.
I shall examine the role of learning in a simple
model of aggregate demand and supply.
2 For
those who enjoy equations, a good many are
given in the appendix. There are three equations
for the three key variables: aggregate supply,
aggregate demand, and the money stock. The
model is standard—with one exception. In the
recent literature on the “inflation bias” of discre-
tionary monetary policy, it has become fashion-
able (despite the best efforts of McCallum 1995,
1996) to assume that the central bank aims for a
rate of unemployment below the market-gener-
ated natural rate of unemployment. Put simply,
the central bank uses monetary expansions to
create jobs which do not exist in the long run.
In contrast, I shall assume that the central bank
does not use monetary policy as a substitute
for microeconomic structural reforms. Because it
is not trying systematically to push unemploy-
ment below the natural rate, there is no “time
inconsistency” in monetary policy. By relating
monetary policy to macroeconomic rather than
microeconomic goals, there is no “inflation bias”
and hence no obstacle to the achievement of
price stability.
The model is simple. First, aggregate supply
exceeds the “natural” rate of output when inflation
is higher than was expected by agents when
nominal contracts were set. Positive price sur-
prises make it profitable for firms temporar-
ily to increase output. Output is also subject to
random shocks. These are of two types. The first
(type 1 shocks) are shocks which can be observed
by the central bank before monetary policy is
determined, but which the private sector observes
only after wages and prices have been set for that
period. Monetary policy can respond to those
shocks. The second (type 2 shocks) cannot be
observed by the central bank until after policy
has been set for that period. They may not be
observable until data are published some
months after the event. Type 2 shocks will
introduce additional randomness into inflation
and output, but are not central to the choice of
monetary strategy.
3
30 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYAggregate demand is positively related to real
money balances and to expected inflation. That
is the reduced form of a system in which the
demand for money is a function of nominal
expenditure and nominal interest rates, the demand
for goods is a function of real money balances
and the real interest rate, and the real interest rate
is equal to the nominal interest rate less the
expected inflation rate.
The final relationship describes the process by
which the central bank determines the growth of
the money supply. In the technical jargon, mone-
tary policy is a “reaction function” which deter-
mines policy as a function of changes in observable
economic variables. Each period the money sup-
ply (or, equivalently, the short-term interest rate)
is set by the central bank in full knowledge of
the size of the shock to output, which it has been
able to observe. The expectations of the private
sector that influence demand and supply are,
however, formed before agents can observe the
shock. That reflects nominal stickiness in setting
wages and prices. It is possible, therefore, to
express the monetary policy reaction function as
a choice by the central bank of two variables.
The first is an inflation target for that period,
defined as the value of the inflation rate which
the central bank would like to achieve in the
absence of any shock to output. The second term
is the discretionary response by the central bank
to the observed shock that leads it to choose
values for interest rates or monetary growth that
are an appropriate response to the shock. It is
shown in the appendix that it is possible to
compress the model into two equations—for
inflation and output. These are:
inflation = inflation target + RI(type 1 shock) +
type 2 shock
output = natural rate + b(inflation target-expected
inflation)
+ RO(type 1 shock) + type 2 shock,
where RI and RO are coefficients which describe
the effects of monetary responses to type 1 shocks
on inflation and output, respectively, and b mea-
sures the impact of inflation surprises on output.
There are two points to note. First, any mone-
tary policy can be described as a choice of (1)
an ex ante inflation target and (2) an optimal
response to observable shocks. An inflation tar-
get is not a particular form of setting monetary
policy; rather, it is its generic form. That is why
the difference between an inflation target regime
for monetary policy and a regime based on a mone-
tary target can easily be exaggerated. Choosing
the inflation target, however, does not uniquely
define monetary policy. There is the subsidiary
question of how policy should respond to
shocks. It is important to distinguish these two
aspects of policy in order to avoid confusion
between changes in trend inflation, which are
monetary, and changes in price levels caused by
real shocks.
Second, inflation can differ from the long-run
desired level which corresponds to price stabil-
ity, for three reasons. First, the inflation target
itself may differ, at least temporarily, from zero.
Second, it may be optimal to accommodate a
temporary inflation shock. Third, there may be
other shocks to inflation about which the central
bank can do little in time to prevent their feeding
through to the final price level. Since the shocks
average to zero over a period, it is clear that a
central bank can achieve price stability by setting
its inflation target to zero (or whatever measured
inflation rate corresponds to price stability).
The two equations determine inflation and
output as a function of the choices made by the
central bank (the inflation target and the discre-
tionary response to a shock), the expected
inflation rate, and the shock to output. For any
given model of learning by the private sector
about how the central bank will set its inflation
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 31target it is possible to solve for the actual paths
of inflation and output (see the appendix).
Suppose that inflation has averaged some posi-
tive rate for a period, and that both expected
inflation and the implicit inflation target are
consistent with that rate. If the central bank now
announces that it intends to pursue price stability
in the future, what will happen to inflation and
output? That depends on how quickly expecta-
tions adjust to the new monetary strategy. Three
cases may be analyzed corresponding to different
models of learning. These are rational expecta-
tions; exogenous learning, in which expecta-
tions adjust along a path that is independent of
the inflation out-turn; and endogenous learning,
in which the speed of learning depends on the
policy choices made by the central bank.  
A fully credible change in regime
A change to a regime of price stability that is
fully credible means that private sector expecta-
tions are consistent with the adoption of a new
inflation target corresponding to price stability.
When expected inflation equals the actual infla-
tion target chosen by the central bank, there is
no systematic deviation of output from its natu-
ral rate. Policy can achieve price stability with-
out any expected output loss. The optimal
strategy is to move immediately to a zero infla-
tion target. There is, however, one exception,
even in the case of full credibility. In an open
economy, nominal wage and price stickiness
may mean that, after a change to a regime of
price stability, the exchange rate rises to a level
above its long-run equilibrium corresponding to
the new monetary policy, causing a short-term
rise in the real exchange rate. Such Dornbusch
overshooting of the exchange rate depresses the
demand for domestically produced output. In
that case the time horizon for a move to price
stability is determined by the duration of nomi-
nal stickiness.
Exogenous learning
In general, an announcement by the central
bank that in the future the inflation target will be
consistent with price stability does not com-
mand immediate credibility. It takes time for the
private sector to be convinced that the target will
be chosen to be consistent with price stability.
The private sector will try to learn about the true
preferences of the central bank. Their pro-
nouncements will not necessarily be taken at
face value. Modeling learning is difficult. As
Sargent argues:
The characteristics of the serial correlation of
inflation are inherited from the random properties
of the deep causes of inflation, such as monetary
and fiscal policy variables (1986, p. 113).
There is no unique way to model rational
learning. Nevertheless, it seems implausible to
suppose that learning takes place immediately
upon a switch to a new monetary regime. By
moving rapidly to price stability, a central bank
can hope to demonstrate that it is committed to
price stability. Indeed, in a world in which there
are only two kinds of central banks—“tough”
and “weak”—it has been shown that a “tough”
central bank will disinflate just fast enough to
differentiate itself from a “weak” central bank
that might otherwise be tempted to pass itself off
as a true inflation-fighter. (Vickers 1986, Pers-
son and Tabellini 1990). In practice, there is a
spectrum of views on inflation that might be
held by a monetary authority, and it becomes
much more difficult to learn where on that spec-
trum a central bank lies. Successful regime shifts
usually occur when public opinion is behind the
need for a dramatic reform, and hence the sus-
tainability of the reform is more credible. That
support is less obvious for a shift from low and
moderate inflation rates to price stability than
when tackling a hyperinflation. To be credible,
the change in regime must be widely understood
32 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYand thought likely to persist. For that to be the
case, it is insufficient for a central bank to make
a public announcement; the change must also be
thought acceptable to a wider public. Consider
the following example of a clear regime shift
suggested by Sargent, 
It is arguable that pegging to a foreign currency
is a policy that is relatively easier to support and
make credible by concrete actions, since it is
possible to hook the domestic country’s price
expectations virtually instantaneously onto the
presumably exogenous price expectations pro-
cess in the foreign country (1986, p.121).
When Britain joined the ERM in 1990, infla-
tion expectations did not jump to those in Ger-
many or other “inner” core members of the
ERM. Inflation expectations did fall modestly,
and they rose again when Britain left the ERM
in September 1992. But the process of learning
about the government’s commitment, both to the
ERM and to price stability, did not stop upon
entry to the ERM. That shows that a regime
shift may be easier to identify in theory than in
practice.
Much of the process of learning about central
bank preferences is independent of the actual
evolution of inflation itself. Central bank behavior
reflects the degree of external support for its
objectives. And since the ultimate basis for a
central bank commitment to price stability is a
wider public support for that objective, it is not
easy to forecast how quickly a central bank will
be able or willing to move toward price stability.
In practice, learning is continuous. The idea that
private agents are trying to learn about a fixed
point—the long-run inflation target—misses
some important aspects of behavior. Central banks
are not static institutions. There is turnover
among members of the governing board, and
new ideas about monetary policy are continually
injected into the policy debate. Since central
banks’ views change, private agents need to
learn continuously about those views.
4 The sig-
nificant reduction in inflation in the industrial
countries over the past 20 years surely derives at
least as much from the gradual acceptance that
there is no long-run trade-off between inflation
and unemployment as from changes in prefer-
ences about inflation itself. It is worth examin-
ing, therefore, the consequences of a learning
process that is exogenous to the short-run path
of inflation.
If expected inflation exceeds the inflation target,
then there are systematic output losses during
the transition to price stability. It would be costly
to pursue price stability from the outset. It is
possible to calculate the optimal transition path
given the objective of minimizing deviations of
inflation from the desired level of zero and of
output from its natural rate. There is a trade-off
between the two. Too slow a reduction in the
inflation target implies inflation remains high
for a long period; too rapid an approach to the
long-run target means large output losses.  
It is shown in the appendix that when expected
inflation converges on price stability at an exoge-
nous rate, then it is optimal to set the inflation
target at a constant proportion of the exogenous
expected inflation rate. That proportion depends
upon (a) the weight attached to the importance
of keeping inflation close to price stability rela-
tive to keeping output close to its natural rate,
and (b) the impact of inflation surprises on out-
put. The inflation target converges gradually to
price stability but is always below expected
inflation. Inflation itself also falls gradually.
The “gradualist” path to price stability is,
in general, preferable to either a “cold turkey”
strategy, in which the inflation target is set to
zero from the outset, or an “accommodation”
strategy in which the inflation target declines
in line with expected inflation. The former
involves greater output losses during the tran-
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 33sition and the latter involves larger deviations of
inflation from price stability.
Figure 1a shows an example in which expec-
tations decline steadily, and linearly, over a fixed
period of length T. Both output and inflation
adjust to their long-run values gradually over
time. If the relative importance which the central
bank attaches to minimizing deviations of infla-
tion from price stability relative to deviations of
output from its natural rate is denoted by a, and
b measures the impact on output of price surprises,
then the cumulative output loss during the tran-
sition to price stability is [ ab/ (a+b
2 ) ] p0 (T/2),
where p0 is the initial inflation rate.
5 Plausible
values are a = 0.25 and b = 0.5 for quarterly data.
Hence the cumulative output loss along the
optimal transition path from an initial inflation
rate of 10 percent a year to price stability when
learning is complete only after ten years is 12
percent of the initial level of annual output. That
can be contrasted with the cumulative output loss
under the “cold turkey” strategy of over 24 percent.
Random shocks to the economy make the path
less smooth than that shown in Figure 1a. It is
possible to simulate the shocks, and Figure 1b
shows a path both during and after the transition to
price stability for parameters of the random process
generating shocks fitted to UK data. Figure 1b
plots output each quarter and inflation over the



















34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYdefinitions of published statistics. Not surpris-
ingly, the 12-month inflation rate changes more
smoothly over time than does quarterly output.
The path to price stability contains periods in
which inflation rises before converging to zero.
Endogenous learning
In the previous section it was argued that there
are good reasons to suppose that, in trying to
learn about the future inflation target of the
central bank, many of the relevant factors are
exogenous to the path of inflation itself. But a
central bank may try to convince the private
sector of its commitment to price stability by
choosing to reduce its inflation target toward
zero quickly. One might call this “teaching by
doing.” The choice of a particular inflation tar-
get influences the speed at which expectations
adjust to price stability. Each period the private
sector can look back and infer from the shocks
that occurred in the past the inflation target that
was chosen in the previous period. It then
updates its belief about the current inflation
target according to how fast the actual inflation
target itself adjusts to price stability. I call this a
case of endogenous learning. The optimal speed
at which the inflation target approaches zero is
derived in the appendix for the special case of a
constant updating parameter. As in the case of
exogenous learning, price stability is reached
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tions of the inflation target will depend upon the
perceived uncertainty of the commitment to
price stability. With a stable institutional arrange-
ment for monetary policy, credibility is likely to
grow over time. But any uncertainty over the
continuation of the new regime, perhaps because
of a lack of public support, slows down the
acquisition of credibility.
The rationality attributed here to private agents—
in which they can observe past shocks and so infer
the previous period’s inflation target—means that
the optimal degree of flexibility in monetary
policy is unaffected by whether learning is
endogenous or exogenous. If, however, learning
depends on the actual rate of inflation rather than
the inferred inflation target, then it may be opti-
mal not to accommodate temporary inflation
shocks for fear that doing so might lead to higher
inflation expectations in the future. In this case
in the early stages of the transition to price
stability it is optimal to pursue a much less
flexible monetary policy than would be desir-
able once credibility had been attained.
The general prediction of the learning models
is that the inflation target—and hence actual
inflation—will fall faster in the earlier years of
the transition and will always lie below expected
inflation. That appears to have been the U.K.
experience during the 1980s. Chart 2 shows
expected inflation derived from a comparison
between the yields on nominal and index-linked
government bonds and the actual inflation rate.

























36 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYof the period toward the end of the decade when
the pursuit of price stability was temporarily
suspended. The data are not ideal for the purpose
of making comparisons with the model. Esti-
mates of expected inflation are available only
from 1982, some three years after the initial
change in regime, and they refer to inflation
expected some ten years ahead because of diffi-
culties in estimating accurately the short end of
the yield curve. But the general pattern is clear,
and seems to have been repeated in the renewed
attempt to reach price stability in the 1990s. It is
evident that the United Kingdom has not
achieved credibility in its stated inflation target.
The data in Chart 2 can be used to estimate the
learning model given by equation 22 in the
appendix. From 171 observations, the estimated
value of the updating parameter r is 0.921 with
a standard error of 0.023. For the case consid-
ered above where a = 0.25 and b = 0.5, this
estimate implies that it takes just over six years
before the inflation target falls from 10 percent
to 5 percent a year. 
Table 3 and Chart 3 provide information on
the two speeds of adjustment of inflation dis-
cussed above. The upper panel of Table 3 shows
the change in inflation from a cyclical peak to
the next trough in a number of industrialized
countries. The speed at which inflation was
brought down is shown together with the aver-
age inflation rate over the period 1965 to 1995.
The data refer to completed cycles over that
period. The average speed is a mixture of the
speed of disinflation and the rate at which tempo-
rary shocks to inflation are allowed to die away.
Chart 2
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INFLATION CHANGES OVER THE CYCLE
Country
Change from 
peak to next 
trough (pp) 








(1)   (b) (c)  (2) (1)/(2) 
Germany -3.8 11 -.6 6 3.6
UK -8.6 6 -1.5 13 8.1
United States -5.2 10 -.5 5 5.3
Italy -6.8 9 -1.1 11 9.2
Japan -4.7 7 -.9 9 5.0
France -3.9 12 -.3 1 6.4
Canada -3.2 8 -.4 2 5.6
Belgium -5.2 9 -.5 4 5.0
Netherlands -4.1 7 -.7 7 4.5
Sweden -6.2 8 -.9 10 7.0
Switzerland -4.7 9 -.5 3 3.9
Australia -6.5 9 -.7 8 7.0









per quarter Ranking (a)
(1) (2) (1)/(2)
Germany 4.0 11 .5 1
UK 8.6 8 1.1 11 =
United States 5.3 9 .6 5
Italy 7.2 7 1.1 13
Japan 4.3 7 .7 9
France 3.8 8 .5 2
Canada 3.1 5 .6 4
Belgium 4.4 9 .5 3
Netherlands 3.7 8 .7 7
Sweden 6.3 9 1.1 11 =
Switzerland 4.6 8 .7 8
Australia 6.3 11 .6 6
New Zealand 7.8 10 .9 10
(a)  Ranking is from lowest to highest rate of change of inflation.
(b)  For peak-to-trough or trough-to-peak half cycles started and completed between March 1965 and 1992.
(c)  Inflation as measured by the three month moving average of the annual rate of change of the CPI.
Source: IFS.
38 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYCountries with a credible commitment to stable
low inflation have inflation slopes—defined as
the reduction in inflation per quarter—of around
0.5. Countries with worse inflation records, such
as the United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden, and over
much of the period New Zealand, show much
steeper slopes with an absolute value around
unity. There does seem to be evidence that the
two speeds of adjustment are different. In the
lower panel of Table 3, similar calculations are
presented for the change in inflation from a
cyclical trough to the next peak. A similar pat-
tern emerges, reflecting the speed with which
the lower credibility countries allowed inflation
to rise in the 1960s and 1970s. Chart 3 plots the
profile of inflation for selected G-10 countries
over the period 1965 to 1995. The difference in
the inflation slopes is evident.
There is one additional cost of a disinflation
in which actual inflation falls faster than expected
inflation. With government debt fixed in nomi-
nal terms, the burden of the debt rises when there
is unanticipated disinflation. At last year’s Jack-
son Hole conference I called this “unpleasant
fiscal arithmetic” (King 1995). Too rapid a dis-
inflation can, therefore, add to the fiscal burden.
But there is a ready solution at hand—the use of
index-linked debt.
II. THE OPTIMAL FLEXIBILITY OF
MONETARY POLICY
The previous section discussed the optimal
speed of adjustment from some initial inflation
rate to price stability. Although the overriding
objective of monetary policy is price stability,
that does not uniquely define monetary policy.
Inflation can differ from the target level because
of either type 1 or type 2 shocks. Price stability
is better defined as a situation in which the
inflation target is equal to the expected rate of
inflation and both in turn equal zero. That cor-
responds better with Alan Greenspan’s defini-
tion of price stability in which inflation does not
affect significantly decisions by economic
agents, and leaves open the choice of the optimal
response to type 1 shocks. In general, it is opti-
mal to accommodate part of any such shock. The
fraction that is accommodated depends upon the
relative weight attached to deviations of infla-
tion from price stability, on the one hand, and to
deviations of output from its natural rate, on the
other.
6 As John Crow has argued, a mandate of
price stability does not absolve a central bank from
taking countercyclical actions, but its purpose is
“to ensure that such actions when taken do not
build in an inflationary bias, not that they not be
taken at all.”
7
In most cases the optimal degree of accommo-
dation of temporary shocks is quite separate
from the optimal speed of disinflation. But when
learning depends on past inflation, matters are
more complicated. Any accommodation of an
upward shock to inflation, albeit temporary,
affects future expectations of inflation. That in
turn increases the output costs of any given
inflation target. Hence, especially in the early
stages of the transition to price stability, it pays
not to accommodate as much of the inflation
shock as would be optimal once expectations
have adjusted to price stability. A central bank
that is embarking on the road to price stability
cannot afford to engage in as much flexibility in
monetary policy as can a central bank which has
established a track record for a commitment to
price stability. There is a tradeoff between credi-
bility and flexibility. But that tradeoff exists
only during the transition to price stability. That
may explain why there is little empirical evi-
dence of a tradeoff between credibility and flexi-
bility in cross-section data. 
There is a further reason for caution in a
transition to price stability. It is clear from the
literature on time inconsistency of monetary
policy that a central bank which tries to stabilize
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INFLATION IN SELECTED G10 COUNTRIES
Source: ONS for United Kingdom, IFS for other G10 countries.
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 41output around a level in excess of the natural rate
can create an inflationary bias. During the tran-
sition, it is important for the central bank to
convince the market that it is not trying to use
monetary policy to achieve a level of output in
excess of the natural rate as a substitute for
structural reforms. In the absence of a track
record of price stability, it is quite possible that
the market may be suspicious that a central bank
is trying to do just that. This is quite distinct from
the issue of the speed of learning. And it suggests
why central banks are extremely cautious in
their use of language to describe how output
affects monetary policy. It is easy for economists
to make a clear, logical distinction between two
different models. But it is vital for a central
bank to ensure that markets do not suspect it of
behaving according to one model rather than the
other. And that is not straightforward when the
key variables—the natural rate of unemploy-
ment and the output gap—are not observable.
Hence, even though it may be perfectly rational
to accommodate temporary shocks to inflation,
the need to ensure that markets do not suspect
other motives implies the importance of caution
in the language used by central banks about
output stabilization. Words matter. Indeed, actions
may be safer than words.
Another aspect of the link between the two
elements of monetary policy—the inflation
target and the response to shocks—has surfaced
in the recent proposal for an “opportunistic”
approach to disinflation, an idea associated with
Alan Blinder.
8 An analysis of the opportunistic
model has been provided by Orphanides and
Wilcox (1996). The opportunistic approach
implies that when inflation is either too high or
too low the approach to price stability is as
analyzed above. But when inflation is in an
intermediate range, the inflation target is not
reduced any further unless there is a negative
inflation shock. When such a shock occurs no
attempt is made to benefit from a temporary
excess of output over trend—the shock is fully
accommodated. The inflation target is then ratch-
eted down. There is an asymmetric approach to
positive and negative shocks when inflation is
in the intermediate range. Positive shocks are
suppressed; negative shocks are accommodated.
Why would a central bank behave in this way?
Orphanides and Wilcox identify two conditions
under which a central bank might pursue such a
strategy. First, its attitude to current inflation
must depend on the path of inflation in the recent
past. To quote the example given by Orphanides
and Wilcox,
An opportunistic policymaker evaluates a 3 per-
cent rate of inflation today less favorably if infla-
tion yesterday was 2 percent than if inflation
yesterday was 4 percent. In the former case, an
opportunistic policymaker might well aim to drive
output below potential, whereas in the latter case,
she would aim simply to hold output at potential.
Second, the central bank pursues output stabi-
lization when inflation is low, and price stability
when inflation is high. An opportunistic central
bank which starts with low inflation will focus
on output stabilization even if inflation drifts
upward for a time.
But that strategy may be observationally equiva-
lent to that of a central bank which uses monetary
policy to target a level of employment in excess
of the natural rate—that is, to create jobs that are
not there—and incurs the inflation bias of dis-
cretion. Equally, a central bank that waits for
negative inflation shocks before reducing infla-
tion may also appear similar to a central bank
that is trying to achieve unemployment below
the natural rate. The loss of credibility may then
create output losses when inflation is reduced.
So far I have examined learning by economic
agents. But central banks learn also. An optimal
monetary strategy can be expressed in terms of
a predetermined rule only if the procedure for
42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYupdating the policy rule can itself be written as
a rule. Since there is no unique optimal learning
strategy, that is unlikely. But if discretion is
inevitable, then why has it been suggested that
several central banks have, in fact, followed
rules, in particular the rule suggested by John
Taylor?
9 The Taylor rule implies that nominal
short-term official interest rates should be set
such that the real interest rate differs from the
real interest rate that would hold at the natural
rate of output by an amount which is propor-
tional to the excess of output over its natural rate
and the excess of inflation over its target rate. It
is vital to distinguish between two uses of the
Taylor rule. The first is as a normative rule for
policy. The second is as a positive description of
the behavior of central banks in practice. The
Taylor rule implies a correlation between real
interest rates, output, and inflation. In the nor-
mative sense, causation runs from interest rates
to output and inflation. But such a correlation
exists in any economy that behaves according to
the simple model presented in this paper. It is
easy to show that, for any choice of inflation
target and response to temporary shocks, the
linear relationship between real rates, output,
and inflation is identical to the Taylor rule (see
appendix). Any set of observations can be ration-
alized as a Taylor rule for a suitable choice of
inflation target. Hence it is impossible to distin-
guish between those central banks which are
following a Taylor rule and those which are not.
Differences show up in the time paths of infla-
tion and output, not in the relationship between
real interest rates, inflation, and output. 
The main lesson from the discussion of rules
is the importance of trying to ensure that private
sector expectations are consistent with the
monetary strategy pursued by the central bank.
It is the predictability of policy rather than the
fact that the policy can be expressed in terms of
a rule that is crucial. If the exercise of discretion
is inevitable, then predictability implies a sig-
nificant degree of transparency in the setting of
monetary policy. Explanations by the central
bank of the rationale for policy help to increase
predictability and reduce volatility. Monetary
policy in both the United Kingdom and the
United States in recent years has clearly not
followed a simple rule. But it has been some-
what more predictable than at times in the past.
One consequence is that quite small changes in
official interest rates—or even a decision not to
change rates—have led to significant move-
ments in short-term market rates and hence to
short-term real interest rates. Charts 4 and 5
show the short end of the yield curve in the
United Kingdom and the United States, respec-
tively, from January 1994. In both countries
modest movements in official rates led to sig-
nificant changes in expected three-month mar-
ket interest rates over the following 12 to 24
months. Rates moved in anticipation of future
policy changes, and the yield curve did a lot of
the work in altering the stance of monetary
policy.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The main point of this paper is simple. The
design of monetary policy in the transition to
price stability must take seriously learning by
both economic agents and the central bank. No
successful transition can be designed that
ignores  learning by private sector agents about
the implicit inflation target of the monetary
authority. Equally, pure rational expectations
models are not a good basis on which to base
policy because they ignore the process of learn-
ing. Models of learning under conditions of
bounded rationality are few and far between. As
Sargent puts it, 
We might have prejudices and anecdotes to guide
our preferences among transition strategies but no
empirically confirmed informed theories
(1993, p.1).
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the transition is an illusion. But central banks
can try to accelerate the learning process by
“teaching by doing;” in other words, making clear
their own preferences and explaining their own
view of how the economy behaves. Like economic
agents, central bankers do not have a fixed stock
of knowledge. They learn—especially from con-
ferences at Jackson Hole—and the product of
this learning should be communicated to the
public at large. That is one reason why transpar-
ency is important. A switch in monetary regime
from hyperinflation to low and stable inflation
is likely to be sufficiently dramatic that the
behavior of inflation itself communicates the
change to agents. But the transition from low or
moderate inflation to price stability will be more
difficult to detect. In those circumstances, trans-
parency can help to speed up learning by both
private agents and the central bank.
The overriding objective of monetary policy
should be price stability. But two subsidiary
questions arise. First, how fast should a central
bank disinflate in order to reach price stability?
Second, how flexible should policy be in accom-
modating temporary inflation shocks in order to
avoid costly volatility in output? An optimal
monetary strategy is a choice of an ex ante
inflation target and a discretionary response to
temporary shocks. In general, the optimal speed
of disinflation is a gradual approach to price
stability, but one in which the inflation target is
always below expected inflation and falling.
Chart 4








































Note: Interest rate expectations are based on a combination of sterling interest rate futures contracts.
Sources: Bank of England and LIFFE.
February 2, 1995
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44 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYThere should also be some accommodation of
temporary shocks. Any response to such shocks
should be more cautious in the early stages of
a transition in order to speed up learning by the
private sector of the central bank’s commit-
ment to reducing the inflation target. None of
that is surprising. It is merely the best practice
of successful central banks that combine a choice
of an inflation target with some degree of flexi-
bility in response to shocks. What successful
central banks have in common is not a particular
intermediate target to guide policy, but rather a
common policy reaction function.
Chart 5


















Note: Interest rate expectations are based on a combination of U.S. dollar interest rate futures contracts.
May 9, 1996
August 2, 1996
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Optimal disinflation
The propositions about the optimal speed
of disinflation discussed in the main part of
the paper can be demonstrated rigorously in
a simple macroeconomic model which com-
bines nominal wage and price stickiness and
slow adjustment of expectations to a new
monetary policy regime. The model has
three key equations—for aggregate supply,
aggregate demand, and money supply. This
last equation is the central bank’s policy
reaction function.
Aggregate supply in period t, yt , is given
by a reduced form supply function (or short-
run Phillips curve)
yt = yt
* + b(pt - p ^
t) + et, (1)
where yt
* is the “natural” rate of output, pt is
the inflation rate, p ^
t is the private sector’s
expectation of the central bank’s target inflation
rate in period t, and et is an aggregate distur-
bance which is assumed to be white noise.
All variables other than inflation and interest
rates are measured in natural logarithms.
Aggregate demand is a function of real
money balances and expected inflation.
10
yt = c(mt - pt) + dp ^
t, (2)
pt = pt - pt-l, (3)
where mt is the money stock.
Each period the money supply (or, equiva-
lently, the short-term interest rate) is set by
the central bank in full knowledge of the size
of the shock to output (the realization of e).
The expectations of the private sector which
influence demand and supply are, however,
formed before e is observed. That assump-
tion reflects nominal rigidities in setting
wages and prices, and other nominal con-
tracts.
Given the linear structure of the model and
the serially uncorrelated nature of the supply
shock, the most general form of a monetary
policy reaction function is
mt = l1t + l 2t et, (4)
Note that the money supply process is
allowed to vary on the transition path to
price stability.
For any given policy reaction function, the
model can be solved to give paths for output
and inflation in each period as a function of
private sector expectations, the aggregate
shock, and the parameters of the model.
Substituting equation 4 into equations 1 to 3
yields
yt = yt










t + bt et, (5)
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I shall assume that the central bank has
rational expectations in the sense that it
understands that output and inflation are
generated by equations 5 and 6. It is possible
to rewrite the monetary policy reaction func-
tion in terms of the central bank’s choice of
an inflation target each period. The inflation
target is defined as the rational expected
value of inflation before e is realized which
is given by
pt




















 et . (9)
Monetary policy is a choice of an ex ante
inflation target, pt
*, and a response to stochas-
tic shocks described by the choice of bt.
Consider a switch from a monetary policy
regime in which inflation has averaged p0 to
a regime of price stability in which average
inflation is zero. What is the optimal transi-
tion path? That will depend upon how
quickly private sector expectations adjust to
the new regime. It is useful to consider three
cases: (1) a completely credible regime
switch: private sector expectations adjust
immediately to the new policy reaction
function—this is the case of rational or
model-consistent expectations; (2) exoge-
nous learning: expectations adjust slowly
along a path exogenous to the actual policy
choices made in the new regime; (3) endo-
genous learning: the speed of learning
depends on the policy decisions made in the
new regime.
Case 1: Fully credible regime switch
With a completely credible regime change,
private sector expectations are consistent with

















 et . (11) 
Since the level of output is independent of
the inflation target, policy can aim at price
stability without any expected output loss.
The optimal policy is to move immediately
to a zero inflation target.
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Case 2: Exogenous learning
The central bank announces that it intends
to move to a regime of price stability,
defined as a regime in which the uncondi-
tional expectation of inflation each period is
zero. But the private sector adjusts its beliefs
about the inflation target only slowly, and at
a rate that is exogenous to the monetary
policy decisions taken in the transition.
From equation 9, it follows that if expected
inflation exceeds the inflation target then
there are systematic output losses during the
transition to full credibility. It may be costly
to pursue price stability from the outset of
the new regime. How should the central
bank choose the inflation target during the
transition? From case 1 it is clear that once
credibility has been established, it is optimal
to set the inflation target to zero. During the
transition, optimal monetary policy is a
sequence for the pair {pt
*, bt}. Let the loss
function of the central bank be defined over
the expected value of the squared deviations
of inflation from its desired level of zero and
of output around the natural rate.
11 
Lt = aEpt
2 + E(yt -yt
*)
2. (12) 
Denote the length of the transition to full
credibility under exogenous learning by T.
Assuming no discount factor, the loss during
the transition is























* and b1 gives the
optimal monetary policy as
pt









Provided that learning is exogenous, the
optimal transition to price stability is to
allow inflation to fall gradually. The infla-
tion target should start out at a fraction of the
initial inflation rate and then decline as a
constant proportion of the exogenous expected
inflation rate. The expected cumulative out-



















The optimal path may be contrasted with the
two extremes of pursuing price stability
from the outset—a “cold turkey” strategy—and
setting the inflation target to accommodate
inflation expectations—an accommodation
strategy. The “cold turkey” strategy is
defined by 
pt
* = 0     t. (16)
A
{}
48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYOn average, price stability is achieved
even during the transition period, but only at
the cost of an expected cumulative output
loss of





A strategy of full accommodation is defined
by
pt
* = p ^
t. (18)
It is clear from equation 9 that such a
strategy eliminates any output loss, but at the
cost of inflation falling only at the exoge-
nous rate of decline of private sector infla-
tion expectations.
In all of these cases it can be seen from
equation 14 that the choice of bt, the flexibil-
ity of monetary policy in the face of shocks,
can be separated from the choice of the
optimal inflation target during the transition.
A convenient representation of exogenous
learning is that expectations adjust linearly











 p0      0 < t £ T 
= 0    t   >   T .
(19)
With that specification, the cumulative
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 p0 . (21)
Case 3: Endogenous learning
The speed at which expectations adjust
depends on actual inflation experience, and
hence on policy choices made during the
transition. A convenient representation of
this learning process is 
p ^
t = rp ^
t-1 + (1-r) pt-1
* . (22)
The smaller is r, the faster is the learning
process. For a positive value of r, expected
inflation converges asymptotically to the in-
flation target. Equation 22 is, however, prob-
lematic. For a well-defined change of
regime it is likely that r will decline over
time under rational learning as more weight
is placed on the lagged inflation target in the
optimal updating rule. But with, for exam-
ple, Markov switching between regimes, r
may not decline. Even with rational learn-
ing, it is unlikely that expected inflation will
jump to the new inflation target.  
The model of learning in equation 22 as-
sumes that agents can infer last period’s
inflation target by adjusting ex post for the
effect of the previous period’s shock on
monetary policy. That is more rational than
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 49assuming that agents look only at past infla-
tion. But if learning does depend on the
actual rate of inflation, as would be the case
if agents could not observe the shock ex post,
then the optimal flexibility of monetary pol-
icy interacts with the optimal speed of dis-








Since learning occurs over an infinite





-t   aEpt
2 + E(yt-yt
*)
2 , (24) 
where q is the time discount rate.
Substituting equations 9 and 23 into the
loss function and differentiating w.r.t.
pt
* yields the following second-order differ-
ence equation for the optimal inflation target
pt
* = pt-1





    -pt-2







The optimal degree of flexibility in mone-
tary policy, measured by b, is the same as in
the case of exogenous learning. 
When learning is defined over the actual
rate of inflation, accommodating temporary
shocks affects expected inflation in the
future. The central bank can invest in credi-
bility by refraining from such stabilization
in the early stages of the transition.
Finally, the model generates data that look
as though the Taylor rule had been followed.
Under the Taylor rule, official nominal
interest rates are set so that the short-term
real interest rate equals the “natural” rate
plus terms related to the deviation of output





For any monetary policy {p
*, b} it is the
case that the model leads to an equation of
the form of equation 26 because all three
variables (expressed as deviations from their
natural or target rates) are proportional to the
shock. Hence it is crucial to distinguish
between a normative and a positive interpre-
tation of equation 26. 
{}
{ } { }
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1  The case for price stability was restated at this conference
by Fischer (1996); recent estimates of the cost-benefit
analysis of moving from moderate inflation to price
stability were given by Feldstein (1996).
 2 An early analysis of the problem can be found in Taylor
(1975). 
3 The formal analysis in the appendix ignores type 2 shocks
which add only random noise to the paths of output and
inflation, and do not alter the optimal speed of disinflation.
4 The importance of continuous learning was stressed by
Balvers and Cosimano (1994).
5 A formal derivation of this result with discrete time
periods is shown in the appendix.
6 Details are provided in the appendix.
7 Letter to the Financial Times, January 8, 1996.
8 Alan Blinder’s views were set out in an opening statement
at his confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in May 1994.
9 Taylor (1993), Clarida and Gertler (1996), Stuart (1996).
10 The aggregate demand function is the reduced form of
the three-equation system:
(i) demand for money    mt = pt + yt -g it, where it is the
nominal interest rate;
(ii) demand for goods  yt = d(mt - pt) - qr1
(iii) definition of the real interest rate rt = it -p ^
t.
Hence in equation 2, c = (q +gd) / (q + g) and d = qg .
11 Note that the loss function does not assume that the
central bank is using monetary policy to target output in
excess of the second-best natural rate as is assumed in those
models which generate an inflationary bias of discretionary
monetary policy.
REFERENCES
Balvers, R.J., and T.F. Cosimano. 1994. “Inflation Variabil-
ity and Gradualist Monetary Policy,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 61, pp. 721-38.
Blinder, A. 1994.“On Sticky Prices: Academic Theories
Meet the Real World,” in N.G. Mankiw, ed., Monetary
Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Brunner, K., and A.H. Meltzer. 1993. Money and the
Economy: Issues in Monetary Analysis, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Clarida, R., and M. Gertler. “How the Bundesbank Con-
ducts Monetary Policy,” National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 5581, mimeo.
Feldstein, M.S. 1996. “The Costs and Benefits of Going
from Low Inflation to Price Stability,” paper presented
at the NBER Conference on Monetary Policy and Infla-
tion, January, mimeo.
Fischer, S. 1996. “Why are Central Banks Pursuing Long-
Run Price Stability?” in Achieving Price Stability, pro-
ceedings of a symposium sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City in Jackson Hole, Wyo.,
August 29-31.
King, M.A. 1995. “Monetary Policy Implications of
Greater Fiscal Discipline,” in Budget Deficits and Debt:
Issues and Options, proceedings of a symposium spon-
sored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in
Jackson Hole, Wyo., August 31-September 2.
Lucas, R.E. 1973. “Some International Evidence on Output-
Inflation Tradeoffs,” American Economic Review, 63,
pp. 326-34.
McCallum, B.T. 1996. “Crucial Issues Concerning Central
Bank Independence,” NBER Working Paper 5597, mimeo.
         .1995.  “Two  Fallacies  Concerning  Cen-
tral Bank Independence,” American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings, 85, pp. 207-11.
Orphanides, A., and D.W. Wilcox. 1996. “The Opportun-
istic Approach to Disinflation,” Federal Reserve Board
Discussion Paper 96-24, mimeo.
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 1990.  Macroeconomic Pol-
icy, Credibility and Politics, London: Harwood Aca-
demic Publishers.
Sargent, T.J. 1993. Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
       .  1986.  Rational Expectations and Infla-
tion. New York: Harper and Row.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 51Stuart, A. 1996. “Simple Monetary Policy Rules,” Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, 36, pp. 281-87.
Taylor, J.B. 1993. “Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Prac-
tice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy, 39, pp. 195-214.
       .  1975.  “Monetary  Policy  During  a  Tran-
sition to Rational Expectations,” Journal of Political
Economy, 83,  pp. 1009-21.
Vickers, J. 1986.  “Signaling in a Model of Monetary
Policy with Incomplete Information,” Oxford Economic
Papers, 38, pp. 443-55.
52 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY